

Methods to Improve State Compliance in International Legal System: Focusing on Theoretical and Practical Fields

Chenfei Deng^{1,a,*}

¹*School of Government, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT, United Kingdom*

a. eKathyyy418@gmail.com

**corresponding author*

Abstract: Improvements in state compliance with international legal rules have been the focus of numerous research papers since the effectiveness of international law depends on state adherence to international legal rules. This paper uses the *Managerial School*, *Reputational Theory*, and *Paris Agreement* to emphasize some key points relating to existing improvement methods. The key points include rational managerial methods in the international community, the importance of reputation and information transparency, the leading of influential nations, and international institutions' roles. Results from the solutions suggest that national interests and self-regulation are central ideas of state adherence. This study also offers supporting evidence of the central ideas and investigates theoretical and practical methods to improve state compliance with international law.

Keywords: International Law, State Compliance, Managerial School, Reputational Theory, Paris Agreement

1. Introduction

State compliance directly affects the effectiveness of international law, while obligations are a recurring element in international politics. In other words, the more states adhere to international legal rules, the more effective those rules will be. According to some international relations scholars and international lawyers, the mechanism of compliance is a natural point of study. Thus, discovering methods to increase federal compliance is crucial in the modern international system, which is also the primary research top of this paper.

This paper will be divided into two parts: National Compliance and Relationship Among International Law, International Organizations, and States and Methods to Improve State Compliance. In the former section, we will go through the definition of compliance. At the same time, we will examine the connection among international law (IL), international organizations (IOs), and states by linking some basic knowledge of IL, IOs, and states, such as history and recognition. The second part will separate methods to improve state compliance into theoretical and practical ones. The theoretical part mainly involved *the Managerial School* by Professor Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes and *the Reputational Theory* by Professor Andrew T. Guzman. By contrasting enforcement, which serves as the initial step in the Chayeses' research, with *the Managerial School*, we will further analyze the Chayeses' point of view in the first theory. We will carefully examine the effects of reputation on the state using reputation theory and the case of *Australia v. France Nuclear Testing*. Finally, we will examine the practical solutions implemented by some international institutions

through a study of the *Paris Agreement* and a comparison with its predecessor, *the Kyoto Protocol*. Despite the many actions taken by some institutions of our time, we will delve into some of the provisions in these treaties and discover how these changes have affected federal compliance.

2. National Compliance and Relationship Among International Law, International Organizations, and States

There is no world government in the international system. According to Bederman and Keitner, all states are equal, and no higher authority exists above countries [1]. Thus, the effectiveness of international law depends on state compliance with international legal rules. The more states comply with international law, the more efficient the law will be. International rules are rarely enforced but usually obeyed. Before we go further into relationships among international law, international organizations, and states, we should glance at national compliance. What is compliance, and how do we define it?

Both international relations scholars and international lawyers are interested in addressing legal problems and discovering compliance mechanisms. National compliance in the law field refers to a certain level of national cooperation with international law. Some analysts distinguish 'compliance', in the sense of conformity for instrumental reasons such as avoidance of punishment, from 'obedience', defined as behavior resulting from the internalization of norms [2]. Compliance does not, however, only apply to legal rules. It is also directly tied to implementation and effectiveness. Sometimes, even when states disobey the law, it nevertheless has the potential to alter state behavior.

International law is another focus of this article. The law consists of guidelines that control behavior and, to some extent, reflect the ideals and concerns of the society intended to govern. International law itself is divided into private international law and public international law. The former typically deals with issues where foreign aspects obtrude into specific legal systems, creating concerns about how foreign law should be applied or how foreign courts should be used. Public international law, in contrast, is a distinct body of law that does not merely supplement a legal system [3]. It regulates the functioning of numerous international and regional institutions. It covers relations between governments in various forms, from war to satellites, trade to human rights, cyber concerns, and environmental protection. International law and international politics cohabit in the same conceptual space. Together, they make up "the international system"—a term used by lawyers, political scientists, and decision-makers to characterize the world they research and attempt to influence [4].

International organizations are essential, consisting of members of the modern international system. There are numerous international institutions with several divisions of our times. The United Nations (UN) is one of the essential international organizations established after *World War II* in the international system. According to Bederman, the United Nations can manage conflict through its collective security mechanisms and prohibitions on aggressive war [1]. With organs of a General Assembly, Security Council, Secretariat, and World Court, along with an Economic and Social Council and Trusteeship Council, the UN takes the responsibility of the League of Nations. Besides the UN, some regional and functional organizations such as NATO and World Trade Organizations are formed in the following decades, focusing on more specific fields. States are usually actors in these institutions. Nations play crucial roles in decision-making and compliance with legal rules since they are the highest authority in the international system. "The question 'What is a state?' is central to the classic theory of international law, based on the view that the state is the only actor in the international legal arena." [5]. Recognizing a group as a state means stating that it satisfies the criteria set forth by international law for statehood. An official response to the recognition of states comes from the Montevideo Convention. It is an international treaty that outlines the criteria for statehood, including a defined territory, a permanent population, a government, and the capacity to enter

relations with other states [6]. Both international organizations and states are compliers to international law. We can claim that they act and work under international legal rules.

3. Methods to Improve State Compliance

International law covers a wide range, including international security, environmental protection, human rights, etc. However, the effectiveness of international law depends on compliance by states; there needs to be some methods to strengthen the latter. Both theoretical and practical methods can be used to improve state compliance, but first, we must comprehend why governments should adhere to agreements. According to (Simmons), we can use realist theory, rational functionalism, domestic regime-based explanations, and normative approaches to explain reasons states comply with agreements though some goals are highly-cost and cannot be centrally enforced. Overall, the four points raised by Simmons can be divided into two categories: profit-driven and self-regulation. When a country is penalized more for breaking a treaty than for upholding it, or when, for instance, some environmental protection treaties may not be immediately effective but later benefit the country and its reputation, compliance is said to be motivated by particular interests in the first scenario. The latter part of self-regulation concerns internal state issues, such as the beliefs of its institutions and leaders, the state's international status, or its morality. Therefore, in connection to the issue of compliance, the internal core of the entire is primarily what needs to be faced and addressed. In later sections, we will go into more detail about whether each strategy's fundamental principles consider national interests and self-regulation.

3.1. Theoretical

In order to ensure the compliance behavior of states, both international relations scholars and international lawyers established numerous theories in specific fields. Siddiqui noted that theories are based on empirical data, such as disputes and ways to understand the roots of low national compliance. We can suggest further measures or implement concentrated actions towards low compliance based on existing theories at the same time. However, not all theories made considerable efforts to address compliance issues among nations in the international system. In this section, we will mainly focus on two theories, *Managerial School* and *Reputational Theory*, to investigate their basic thoughts and contributions to adherence by states. In later sections, we will go into more detail about whether the fundamental principles of each strategy take into account self-regulation and national interests.

3.1.1. Managerial School

Professor Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes expound on managerial school. The Chayeses develop and contrast two alternative strategies, including enforcement and management, to promote treaty compliance. However, they found that the drawbacks of the enforcement model sometimes outweigh its benefits. For instance, repeating sanctions entails high costs to the sanctioner and can raise serious legitimacy problems [7]. Examples, including enforcement power owned by the World Trade Organization (WTO) resulting from reforming the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT) dispute resolution process, indicated that enforcement by international organizations sometimes does not meet our expectations. Although WTO's enforcement powers increased the depth of cooperation among member states, past research illustrates that the total non-compliance with GATT panel rulings approached 30 percent, and almost 60 percent of rulings needed to elicit full compliance [2]. Thus, enforcement may not be the best way to improve state compliance.

The management model has introduced afterward. Chayeses emphasized that all managerial practices include information gathering, reporting requirements, assessment and review of the state parties' compliance performance, monitoring, etc. At the same time, Chayeses identified three key

elements affecting this overall predisposition to comply: efficiency, interests, and norms [8]. They thought governments would follow the path laid out by the treaty system rather than continuously recalculating the costs and advantages of various courses of action with limited resources.

We can examine federal compliance by breaking down these three elements. The efficiency of international law directly affects states' adherence, especially in cases of some environmental-protection laws. Since we usually reap benefits after complying with such legal rules, some states focus on themselves initially. Legal rules' low efficiency largely combats nations' patience and confidence. Thus, federal compliance would decrease.

Interests can be linked with realistic thoughts. Based on realism theory, realists believe that state preferences, ranging from survival to aggrandizement, are exogenous and fixed. Realist approaches often argue that international law is essentially an epiphenomenon of interests or is only made effective through the balance of power [4]. Thus, states' behaviors are often profit-driven. Amplifying the rewards of compliance or bringing non-compliance losses to life is crucial for raising federal compliance.

For normative theorists, norms have a normative 'nature' that influences how states behave, and solutions to the socially constructed problem of compliance strongly emphasize the power of ideas, beliefs, and standards of appropriate behavior [9,10]. However, these normative issues depend on the state itself, and the compliance problem that arises from it needs to be addressed more from within the state rather than by external factors.

3.1.2. Reputational Theory

In *The Limits of International Law*, Goldsmith and Posner stated that reputation would occasionally affect state behaviors [11]. Professor Andrew T. Guzman developed the Reputational Theory. According to the idea, decision-makers operate in a way that maximizes the benefits of their decisions and that states are rational and act in their own best interests [8]. For states, reputational compliance is valuable because a better reputation allows nations to make more credible promises to others while extracting more significant concessions when it negotiates an international agreement [12].

Most states would comply with international legal rules for a good reputation—for example, *the Nuclear Test (Australia v. France)*. On May 9, 1973, Australia and New Zealand launched legal actions against France in response to the country's plan to conduct nuclear bomb testing in the South Pacific. France refused to participate in the open proceedings or submit any pleadings, stating that it thought the court had an apparent lack of jurisdiction. On June 22, 1973, the court issued two orders at the request of Australia and New Zealand that specified temporary measures, including a demand that France refrain from conducting nuclear tests that could cause radioactive fallout on the soil of either nation while the lawsuit is ongoing.

By two judgments issued on December 20, 1974, the court determined that Australia's and New Zealand's applications no longer served any purpose and that it was not necessary to make a ruling on them. The court predicated its decision that Australia and New Zealand's goal had been accomplished on the fact that France had declared in several public comments that it would stop conducting atmospheric nuclear tests when the 1974 series was complete.

Unfortunately, there are few references to compliance discussions between Australia, New Zealand, and Australia. However, we may predict some adhering reasons. First, Australia and New Zealand implemented legal actions against France because the nuclear test violated the rights of the first two nations. Nuclear tests would cause severe and uncontroverted consequences for humans and the environment. Although France did not attend the court, its action tends to be affected by the existing jurisdiction and reputation concerns. The French government may have done this to avoid being perceived as a nation that disregards international law or to prevent the country's reputation from suffering because governments can reap long-term benefits from a better reputation.

3.2. Practical

However, theories are only models trying to explain some aspects of reality. The flaw in theoretical techniques is their overt focus on the causation problem. Therefore, we need practical methods to increase global compliance. McLaughlin, Mitchell, and Hensel (2007) noted, "International organizations encourage certain member nations to settle their issues peacefully while also interfering legally binding/positively through good offices, mediation, fact-finding, or a combination of arbitration and adjudication." [13]. Thus, active actions taken by IOs have a positive impact on state compliance. For example, rational enforcement or sanction in certain agreements can ensure states' compliance. Because the state can gain from reasonable enforcement and sanctions in the long run and enjoy the advantages of a positive reputation [13,14]. In this section, we will go through Paris Agreement to investigate some actions international institutions took.

3.2.1. Paris Agreement

Concerns about climate change do not suddenly appear in recent years; some negotiations were held in the last century against this international issue. Thus, we must adequately examine country compliance with the Paris Agreement by looking at *the Kyoto Protocol*, the precursor to *the Paris Agreement*, and comparing compliance towards these two treaties. In 1997, *the Kyoto Protocol* was negotiated at *the Third Conference of the Paris (COP3)* to the UNFCCC. It mandates that industrialized nations, as indicated in Annex I, reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), mainly CO₂, from burning fossil fuels [15]. However, due to the rise of carbon emissions in China and India, the division between developing and developed countries must be revised [16]. At the same time, the latter takes responsibility for environmental issues. The fact that *the Kyoto Protocol* does not grant countries specific rights to set their targets is one of the factors contributing to low national compliance with *the Kyoto Protocol* compared to *the Paris Agreement*. As was previously mentioned, *the Kyoto Agreement* obliged Annex-I nations (see figure 1) to assume obligations that did not fall within their purview when some developing nations' carbon emissions increased to the point where they gained political clout. This would not only cause discontent among Annex I nations, which would encourage a lower level of cooperation, but it would also decrease the agreement's effectiveness and leads to its failure.



(Source from the UNFCCC official Website)

Figure 1: Annex I Nations of Kyoto Protocol [17]

The terms of *the Paris Agreement* have changed. *The Paris Agreement* was signed in Paris in 2015 as a global environmental protection treaty. With only 29 articles and 16 preambular paragraphs, it is a compact 11-page agreement [18]. At the same time, *the Paris Agreement* has three primary objectives [19]:

1. To keep the rise in the average world temperature "well below" 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.
2. Increasing the capacity to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change.
3. To align financial flows with the two objectives mentioned earlier.

The Paris Agreement introduces some provisions in addition to its three main goals. For instance, according to *Article 13.7*, each party should provide information on a national inventory report of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases regularly. The report should be prepared using appropriate practices and methodologies accepted by the intergovernmental panel on climate change and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties acting as the meeting of the parties to this agreement [19]. We can refer to this as an information transparency obligation. Countries can think about and set new targets for decreasing emissions if they can reveal their greenhouse gas emissions. By doing so, they will clearly understand their products and that of other member countries.

Transparency of information has reinforced federal compliance with Paris Agreement to some extent. Because it stimulates the herding effect in the international system. The Herding theory, which Keynes claimed, concentrated on the reasons people follow the crowd and emulate them in a world of uncertainty [20]. As Baddeley mentioned in her paper, herding can be defined as individuals deciding to follow others and imitating group behaviors rather than deciding independently and automatically based on their private information [21]. Similar to how it is said in economics, the fact that member nations are aware of one another's greenhouse gas emissions, particularly when certain notable ones, like China and the United States, rigidly enforce the treaty, encourages the rest of the nations to do the same, is what drives member nations to reduce their emissions. Furthermore, these prominent nations served as role models for the global community.

In addition to information transparency, allowing countries to set their targets is a reason to make member states more compliant with the Paris Agreement. According to the *Paris Agreement's Article 4.3*, each party's subsequent nationally determined contribution shall be a step up from that party's then-current nationally determined contribution. It shall reflect that party's highest aspiration, as well as its common but distinct responsibilities and respective capabilities, considering the various national circumstances [19]. Because the allowance of individual targets fosters equity and considers the national circumstances of various countries, it improves national compliance. For instance, we could not set the same reduction goal for the Philippines and the US. Regardless of whether the criteria are established in accordance with the national circumstances of any country, it would not be just to hold the Philippines to the same standards as the US. Its emissions are lower than those of the US because it is a developing nation. However, if we set an extraordinarily high emissions reduction target for the Philippines, it means stopping its development. Because both production and transportation produce greenhouse gases, productivity is a critical factor in national development. This treatment would reduce the Philippines' compliance with the Paris Agreement.

Some scholars also pointed out elements to increase global ambition to raise the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement. Höhne et. al present three methods [22]: Firstly, Individuals' intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) must be rapidly and completely implemented; they frequently need to be overachieved. In straightforward terms, this is raising the level of collaboration and responsiveness among nations, requiring strong adherence on the part of nations to fulfill or even surpass their goals. In addition to the compliance brought about by the Paris Agreement itself, as

previously said, there is also the issue of national self-awareness. Implications to national self-awareness include the internality of states and the surveillance of international organizations.

The latter refers to *the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement* (CMA). Annually, the CMA gets together around the same time as the COP. Convention Parties not also Parties to the *Paris Agreement* are permitted to participate in the CMA as observers but not as decision-makers. The CMA makes decisions to support the Paris Agreement's successful implementation and supervises its execution [23]. The CMA serves a monitoring role but needs more authority to compel nations to adhere to their goals. This draws attention to internal problems, including the beliefs and conditions of national leaders and national decision-making institutions. We cannot control internal variables directly, of course, but by using the factors mentioned earlier and the CMA's oversight, we can indirectly alter national perceptions.

The other factor that has contributed to *the Paris Agreement* is more support for the top non-state actors and allowing the results of their efforts to be reflected in national targets [22]. Support for non-state actors can provide them with a better platform and environment and motivate them to continue their efforts. Additionally, the faster-than-expected transformations in some sectors, such as zero-energy buildings, can be used as a model by new "transformative coalitions": groups of countries and other stakeholders with sufficient critical mass who want to change global markets by deploying their resources [22].

However, unforeseen circumstances arise occasionally when countries attempt to abide by *the Paris Agreement* but discover that the outcomes could be more positive because of their issues. For example, the largest carbon dioxide emitter in the world is China. Despite making significant investments in its shift to clean energy, it still gets more than 60% of its electricity from coal [24]. Nevertheless, China has made significant progress in reducing CO₂ emissions; by 2020, carbon intensity was 48.4% lower than in 2005, meeting the goals set forth in the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions and Nationally Determined Contributions. However, China still has a way to go before reaching its peak total CO₂ emissions before 2030 and becoming carbon neutral before 2060 [25].

4. Conclusion

At a broader level, this paper was motivated by the observation that state compliance plays an essential role in the effectiveness of international law. When states adhere to existing legal rules, the order in the international community can be preserved, and some treaties and programs can successfully process. In this study, we examine the definition of federal compliance, the relationship among international law, international organizations, and states, and methods to improve state compliance, including both theoretical and practical.

In the section on theoretical approaches, this paper focuses on Chayes' *school of management* and Professor Guzman's *reputation theory*. The former further emphasizes that getting states to cooperate through a managerial approach is vital to increasing state compliance by contrasting it with coercion. Because states will not be forced to comply with international law for fear of punishment. Meanwhile, the latter examines the state's perception of reputation through *the Australia v. France nuclear testing case*, reflecting the state's reputation's importance in the modern international community. Because a good reputation leads to longer-term benefits for the state. For example, a better reputation allows states to negotiate international agreements with more credible commitments to others while gaining more significant concessions.

The Paris Agreement serves as the foundation for the practical approach's second section, strengthening the treaty's restrictions. The herding effect, which occurs when powerful nations abide by certain international treaties, occurs by comparing it to some of the provisions of its predecessor, *the Kyoto Protocol*. In addition, international organizations play a role in monitoring national

compliance. Transparency of information and providing countries with more rights, such as the ability to set targets based on their national situations, are also essential to increasing national compliance.

Finally, another avenue for future research related to improving state compliance can focus on the connection between theoretical and practical methods. Further research can thoroughly examine how some international organizations' actions are implemented through the existing compliance theories. For example, which international relations scholars or international law lawyers' recommendations have been adopted by the institutions? How have their theories materialized and implemented into corresponding international laws or programs to improve compliance by individual states?

References

- [1] "Bederman and Keitner's International Law Frameworks, 4th (Concepts and Insights Series)." West Academic SCA, <https://www.westacademic.com/Bederman-and-Keitners-International-Law-Frameworks-4th-Concepts-and-Insights-Series-9781634606110>. Accessed 7 July 2023.
- [2] Raustiala, Kal, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. *International Law, International Relations and Compliance*. 347260, 1 Nov. 2002. Social Science Research Network, <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=347260>.
- [3] "International Law | Public International Law." Cambridge University Press, <https://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/law/public-international-law/international-law-9th-edition>, <https://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/law/public-international-law>. Accessed 7 July 2023.
- [4] Slaughter, Anne-Marie. "International Law in a World of Liberal States." *European Journal of International Law*, vol. 6, no. 3, Jan. 1995, pp. 503–38. Silverchair, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.ejil.a035934>.
- [5] Epps, Valerie. "The Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate and Evolution. By Thomas D. Grant. Westport CT, London: Praeger, 1999. Pp. Xxii, 231. Index. \$65." *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 95, no. 1, Jan. 2001, pp. 252–55. Cambridge University Press, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2642068>.
- [6] Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States - The Faculty of Law. <https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/01/1-02/rights-duties-states.html>. Accessed 7 July 2023.
- [7] Koh, Harold Hongju. "Why Do Nations Obey International Law Review Essay." *Yale Law Journal*, vol. 106, no. 8, 1997 1996, pp. 2599–660.
- [8] Siddiqui, Liaquat A. "Compliance with International Law: Theoretical Perspectives." *Dhaka University Law Journal*, vol. 31, no. 1, Dec. 2021, pp. 15–28. DOI.org (Crossref), <https://doi.org/10.3329/dulj.v31i1.57007>.
- [9] Simmons, Beth A. "Compliance with International Agreements." *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1998, pp. 75–93. *Annual Reviews*, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.75>.
- [10] Burgstaller, Mark G. *Theories of Compliance with International Law*. BRILL, 2004. ProQuest Ebook Central, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bham/detail.action?docID=280843>.
- [11] Posner, Eric, and Jack Landman Goldsmith. *The Limits of International Law*. Jan. 2005. *policycommons.net*, <https://policycommons.net/artifacts/1299755/the-limits-of-international-law/1903041/>.
- [12] Guzman, Andrew T. "Reputation and International Law Symposium: The Limits of International Law." *Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law*, vol. 34, no. 2, 2006 2005, pp. 379–92.
- [13] McLaughlin Mitchell, Sara, and Paul R. Hensel. "International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements." *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 51, no. 4, 2007, pp. 721–37. Wiley Online Library, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00277.x>.
- [14] Thompson, Alexander. "The Rational Enforcement of International Law: Solving the Sanctioners' Dilemma." *International Theory*, vol. 1, no. 2, July 2009, pp. 307–21. Cambridge University Press, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971909990078>.
- [15] Böhringer, Christoph. "The Kyoto Protocol: A Review and Perspectives." *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, vol. 19, no. 3, Sept. 2003, pp. 451–66. Silverchair, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/19.3.451>.
- [16] Savaresi, Annalisa. "The Paris Agreement: A New Beginning?" *Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law*, vol. 34, no. 1, Jan. 2016, pp. 16–26. Taylor and Francis+NEJM, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02646811.2016.1133983>.
- [17] Parties | UNFCCC. https://unfccc.int/process/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties-convention-and-observer-states?field_partys_partyto_target_id%5B512%5D=512. Accessed 8 July 2023.
- [18] Horowitz, Cara A. "Paris Agreement." *International Legal Materials*, vol. 55, no. 4, Aug. 2016, pp. 740–55. Cambridge University Press, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020782900004253>.
- [19] "Paris Agreement." *International Legal Materials*, vol. 55, no. 4, 2016, pp. 743–55.
- [20] Stamp, J. C. "Mr. Keynes' Treatise on Money." *The Economic Journal*, vol. 41, no. 162, 1931, pp. 241–49. JSTOR, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2223701>.

- [21] Baddeley, Michelle. "Herding, Social Influence and Economic Decision-Making: Socio-Psychological and Neuroscientific Analyses." *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*, vol. 365, no. 1538, Jan. 2010, pp. 281–90. PubMed Central, <https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2009.0169>.
- [22] Höhne, Niklas, et al. "The Paris Agreement: Resolving the Inconsistency between Global Goals and National Contributions." *Climate Policy*, vol. 17, no. 1, Jan. 2017, pp. 16–32. Taylor and Francis+NEJM, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2016.1218320>.
- [23] Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) | UNFCCC. <https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/supreme-bodies/conference-of-the-parties-serving-as-the-meeting-of-the-parties-to-the-paris-agreement-cma>. Accessed 2 July 2023.
- [24] Tambo, Ernest, et al. "Tackling Air Pollution and Extreme Climate Changes in China: Implementing the Paris Climate Change Agreement." *Environment International*, vol. 95, Oct. 2016, pp. 152–56. ScienceDirect, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2016.04.010>.
- [25] Challenges and Opportunities for Carbon Neutrality in China | Nature Reviews Earth & Environment. <https://www.nature.com/articles/s43017-021-00244-x>. Accessed 30 June 2023.